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2The re-discovery of secular stagnation
On November 8, 2013, at an IMF conference in honor of Stanley Fisher, Lawrence Summers 
raised  the  question  of  whether  it  might  be  necessary  to  revive  the  doctrine  of  “secular 
stagnation”, an expression introduced in passing by Alvin Hansen in 1934 and elaborated 
extensively  in  his  1938  book  and  in  his  1938  American  Economic  Association  (AEA) 
Presidential Address (Hansen 1939). The evidence Summers adduced for reviving this long-
dead idea was twofold: before the 2007-8 financial crisis there had been a massive financial 
expansion, yet there were no signs of overheating in the real economy; and once the crisis 
was  resolved,  there  was  no upturn in  the  economy,  with  incomes stagnating.  A negative 
Wicksellian natural rate of interest, implying that saving exceeded investment at any non- 
negative interest rate, could explain both of these observations. These remarks revived the 
debate over secular stagnation, prompting discussions of, for example, whether the problem 
today is that output is failing to keep up with productive capacity or whether the rate of 
growth  of  productive  capacity  has  fallen  dramatically.  Summers’s  talk  attracted  attention 
from macroeconomists and raised a number of reactions,  included in an ebook edited by 
Coen  Teulings  and  Richard  Baldwin  (2014).  That  was  followed  by  a  session  on  “The 
Economics of Secular Stagnation” held at the AEA January 2015 meetings, with papers by 
Summers,  Robert  Gordon  and  Barry  Eichengreen.1  For  the  first  time  since  Hansen’s 
formulation of the “stagnation thesis” and the extensive debate it prompted throughout the 
1940s and 1950s, the topic is back in the research agenda of (Keynesian) macroeconomics.
The timing of  interest  in  secular  stagnation is  shown by Figure 1,  which plots  the 
number of articles in JSTOR using the word together with a 5-year moving average, to give a 
clearer picture of the trends.  Since Hansen’s 1938 use of the term, it was used increasingly 
frequently until 1950, after which its use declined steadily (with a brief upward blip around 
1960) before becoming used more frequently in the 1970s, reaching a much smaller peak in 
1978, before declining again. There will be another rise in 2012-15. This graph makes no 
allowance for the rising number of journals and articles: doing so would make the decline 
since 1950 even greater. However, at no point after 1938 did it ever completely disappear.
Concealed within this graph are changes in the way the term was used. As we will 
explain, For Hansen, secular stagnation was a long term historical trend, rooted in American 
experience and grounded in an institutionalist approach to economic theory. In contrast, by 
1 Video available at https://www.aeaweb.org/webcasts/2015/Stagnation.php. 
3the early 1950s, secular stagnation was more of an analytical category or descriptive label—
economies might exhibit secular stagnation, secular exhilaration, or there might be no trend 
in unemployment rate—rather than a long-term tendency of capitalism. It had also come to be 
associated with Keynes rather than specifically with Hansen, even if Hansen was considered 
the foremost proponent of the idea. The perceived strength of the theoretical case against 
secular  stagnation  was  connected  to  the  spread  of  competitive-equilibrium theorizing,  in 
which it was hard to avoid the conclusion that, in the long run, the Pigou or real-balance 
effect would eventually generate sufficient aggregate demand to maintain full employment. 
From the 1950s onwards, secular stagnation increasingly became a concept used primarily in 
economic  history,  development  economics  (where  the  use  of  rational-choice,  competitive 
equilibrium models was very limited prior to the 1970s) and the history of economic thought 
(such as making sense of Malthus and Marx).Having lost much of its apparent relevance, 
except for underdeveloped countries, as they were then called, with the Korean war, when 
inflation a more pressing problem than unemployment, stagnation re-emerged as a problem in 
the 1970s (”stagflation”) and in Europe, though not the United States, it remained a problem 
for much of the 1980s. Japanese problems with stagnation appear not to have stimulated use 
of the term in the European-language literature covered by JSTOR. Perhaps the main reason 
for this is that economics is dominated by the United States, and that problems affecting 
Europe or Japan will  almost inevitably be explained in terms of factors specific to those 
regions rather than prompting any reappraisal of economic theory. It was not until the last 
decade, financial crisis of 2007-8, that it was possible to believe that worldwide stagnation 
had re-emerged.
4Figure  1:  Economics  articles  using  the  phrase  “Secular  stagnation”  in  JSTOR, 
1934-2011
Source:  dfr.jstor.org,  search for  “secular  stagnation” in “Economics”.  29 April  2015.  The 
solid line is a 5-year moving average
As historians of economics, our role is not to adjudicate on this current controversy, 
which hinges as much on the interpretation of contemporary data as on economic theory. On 
that we will take a vow of silence. Our concern is with the history of the idea. It is generally 
accepted that, though it may be possible to find similar ideas in, for example, the classical 
economists from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill, or in twentieth century economists such as 
John A. Hobson and Maynard Keynes, the modern theory originated with Hansen. We will 
take that as our starting point, tracing the course of the doctrine from Hansen to Summers. 
We  document  its  demise  in  the  1950s  but  explore  some  of  the  traces  it  left  behind  on 
economic theory and how the focus changed as economic theory changed.
We do not challenge the obvious explanation of the idea’s demise in the 1950s―the fact 
5that the world economy did not revert to the conditions of the 1930s but entered a period of 
unprecedented growth―but we do complicate it. It is not just a story of a disproved theory 
disappearing from sight.
Alvin Hansen and the origins of the stagnation thesis
Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present the 
unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can 
hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward 
movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports. 
(Superintendent of the Census for 1890, quoted in Turner 1921, p. 1)
According to historian Frederick Jackson Turner, this short piece of bureaucratic prose 
marked a historic moment in American society. Up to that point the history of the United 
States had been dominated by its Westward expansion. “The existence of an area of free 
land,” Jackson wrote, “its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement 
western, explain American development” (Turner 1921, p. 1). It affected not just the 
American economy but the whole of society. Its significance was that, unlike European 
frontiers—boundaries between dense populations—it marked the edge of free land. This 
thesis, proposed in 1893, was widely discussed and became an important part of public 
discourse in the early twentieth century.
The economist who introduced this idea into economic theory was Alvin Harvey 
Hansen. Born in 1887 in rural South Dakota to immigrants from Denmark, he came from the 
frontier that according to Jackson was ending. After majoring in English, he moved to the 
University of Wisconsin to study economics and sociology, before moving to Brown and 
writing a thesis on business cycle theory, in which he became a specialist. His early work, 
Cycles of Prosperity and Depression (1921) was empirical. Believing the British economist, 
John A. Hobson, to have rebutted the charge that under-consumption was impossible, Hansen 
explained cycles of prosperity and depression as the result of changes in money and credit. 
From the beginning he sought a dynamic theory and made much use of the accelerator, which 
6showed that even a slowing down of the growth of consumption could lead to an absolute fall 
in investment.
During the 1920s, Turning to the ideas of Albert Aftalion, Arthur Spiethoff and other 
continental European writers, he began to see fluctuations in investment, driven by 
population changes and waves of innovations, as the root cause of the cycle.2 He still thought 
monetary factors played a role, but they merely served to magnify other forces rather than 
being an independent factor. From Aftalion he took the idea that the price level is determined 
by level of money income in relation to the quantity of goods and services being produced. 
The other element was the idea, taken from Spiethoff, there were certain investment 
opportunities available and once these were taken up, investment would fall off, causing a 
downturn. The price system played a dynamic role, assisting the movement of resources into 
sectors with greater investment opportunities. A free enterprise system tended towards full 
employment because price flexibility encouraged a healthy level of investment and a high 
level of spending. However, though there was a tendency towards full employment, the 
business cycle was an inevitable feature of a dynamic, growing economy with rapid 
technological change. Only if the economy matured and accumulation slowed down would 
the cycle become a thing of the past.
These ideas conditioned Hansen’s response to the Great Depression: it was a 
particularly deep depression because it was the result of large monetary and technological 
shocks happening together.3 Recovery required innovation and technological advance that 
would lower costs, raise profitability and stimulate investment. The price mechanism played 
an important role in this process of adjustment of output to technological innovation, and if 
allowed to work, recovery would eventually come. However, though he focused on monetary 
policy and adjustment to technological change through the price mechanism, he never 
abandoned the idea that the flow of spending was important, talking of the “three faucets” 
though which purchasing power entered the economy: business spending, consumer spending 
and government spending. It might sometimes be necessary, he believed, for government to 
take responsibility for maintaining the flow of purchasing power.
In the mid to late 1930s, Hansen added a further element to his theory: declining 
population growth. The most public expression of this idea came on December 28, 1938, in 
2 This account of Hansen draws on Mehrling 1997, pp. 96-101.
3 See Mehrling 1997, pp. 107-10
7Detroit, where he delivered his AEA Presidential Address on the theme of “Economic 
progress and declining population growth” (Hansen 1939). Its central point was that 
population growth was declining and that this would lead to a large fall in investment unless 
there was a rise in technical progress. “We are,” he argued, “rapidly entering a world in which 
we must fall back upon a more rapid advance of technology than in the past if we are to find 
private investment opportunities adequate to maintain full employment” (Hansen 1939, p. 
10). The accelerator was central to this argument, for what mattered was not the level of 
economic activity but its growth rate. It would be possible to compensate for a decline in 
private investment by increasing public investment “in human and natural resources and in 
consumers’ capital goods of a collective character” (Hansen 1939, p. 12), but such 
compensation could be no more than partial. If government spending were taken too far, it 
might alter the cost structure so as to prevent the achievement of full employment. There 
were thus difficult choices, with which economists would have to grapple for a long time.
This explanation fitted well into a long view of American economic history. The 
expansion of the frontier had sustained investment for a century. After the closing of the 
frontier, demand for investment came from technological advance: motor vehicles and 
electricity stimulated the building of a vast infrastructure, sustaining demand in the 1920s. 
The Great Crash of 1929 may have originated in finance and the collapse of speculation, but 
its consequences were severe because the stimulus from these industries was at an end. 
Declining population growth and the absence of new industries meant a dearth of investment 
and a period of stagnation. The immediate origins of the crisis might be short-term, but its 
severity was the result of long-term structural factors.
Hansen (1939, p. 4) defined the “essence of secular stagnation” as “sick recoveries 
which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on themselves and leave a hard and 
seemingly immovable core of unemployment”. As discussed by Hansen (1941) in the chapter 
“The dynamic versus the circular flow economy”, the roots of that concept go back to the 
classical notion of the “stationary state”, particularly as elaborated by J.S. Mill (see also 
Schumpeter 1954, p. 570). Hansen (p. 310) suggested that the term “mature economy” 
described better Mill’s formulation of the stationary state as a low-investment but high-
consumption economy. However, differently from Mill’s stationary state, Hansen’s secular 
stagnation featured chronic unemployment. “The classicals were quite right”, claimed 
8Hansen (p. 288), “when they argued that without technological progress the price system, 
including the rate of interest, would progressively drive the economy to the point at which 
there would be no net investment.” However, he continued, “they were wrong in assuming 
that the price system could also ensure a propensity to consume compatible with this 
investment situation so as to produce full employment”.
Hansen’s secular stagnation concept provoked two different kinds of critical reaction by 
orthodox non-Keynesian economists at the time, related respectively to the investment and 
saving functions. Frank Knight (1936, 1944) rejected the concept of the “stationary state” 
altogether, on the grounds that there is no tendency to diminishing returns to capital 
accumulation, so that, from the long-run perspective, the demand for capital is infinitely 
elastic. As pointed out by Patinkin ([1973] 1981, pp. 32-33), this resulted from Knight’s 
contention that the process of increasing the stock of capital must necessarily change the 
given conditions that generate diminishing returns. Knight had an inclusive concept of capital 
as encompassing all production factors, which can all be accumulated, leaving no fixed factor 
as source of diminishing returns.4 The notion that the rate of return on capital tends to zero 
was also rejected by Henry Simons (1942), but on the somewhat distinct grounds that the 
demand for durable assets increases rapidly at very low but positive interest rates. The 
investment demand curve as a function of the long-term rate of interest is accordingly very 
flat, an argument Simons ascribed to Gustav Cassel (1903).
A.C. Pigou (1943) accepted, of course, the notion of the stationary state. He rejected, 
however, Hansen’s correction of the classical formulation of that concept. Pigou famously 
introduced, as a reaction to Hansen (1941), the hypothesis that the saving function should 
include real money balances as an argument.5 Downward price flexibility, therefore, should 
be able in principle to bring about a shift of the full-employment saving function until it 
intersected investment demand at a positive interest rate. According to Pigou, Hansen’s 
stationary state with unemployment featured a negative equilibrium full-employment rate of 
interest (Wicksell’s natural rate), whereas the market money rate of interest could not fall 
below zero. As pointed out by Pigou, under the classical assumption that saving is made only 
4 Knight would be one of the influences on the so-called AK endogenous growth models with 
linear technology (see Rebelo 1991, p. 507, n. 6).
5 Patinkin (1948, 1956) would call it “Pigou effect”, and further elaborate it as the “real 
balance effect”. Haberler (1941) had already suggested that notion in his criticism of 
Keynes’s General Theory.
9for the sake of the income it is expected to yield in the future, in the long-run equilibrium of 
the stationary state the rate of interest must be equal to the rate of discount of the 
“representative man”. In order to account for a negative natural rate, Pigou assumed that 
savings are made also for other motives (such as the “desire of possession as such”), which 
are inversely related to real cash balances. 
Apart from the classical notion of the stationary state and its limitations, Hansen’s idea 
of secular stagnation was influenced by Keynes’s (1937) Eugenics Review article about the 
macroeconomic effects of a fall in the population growth rate, and by Hawtrey’s (1937) 
distinction between “capital deepening” and “capital widening”.  Hansen (1939) was the first 
to refer to Keynes’s population essay, which remained relatively unknown until its reprint in 
Keynes’s Collected Writings in the 1970s. Although he mentioned Keynes (1937) only 
briefly, in connection with the relative historical stability of the capital-output ratio, Hansen 
(1939) may be seen in part as a further elaboration of Keynes’s theme.6 Indeed, the perverse 
economic impact of declining population growth attracted the attention of British economists 
at the time, such as Reddaway (1939) and Harrod (1939a), whose economic dynamic 
framework (1939b) would attract Hansen’s attention only after its restatement by Harrod in 
1948. Hansen would later refrain from any references to Keynes (1937), which contained an 
incipient formulation of Harrod’s distinction between the natural and warranted growth rates. 
In his obituary article on Keynes, Hansen (1946, p. 184) asserted that Keynes (1936) took for 
granted the “real factors” that determine the marginal efficiency of capital in a “dynamic 
society”. In Hansen’s view, Keynes focused on the “psychological” and “institutional” 
aspects of investment and the rate of interest, while the “real” or “objective” factors were 
“passed by almost unnoticed”. Clearly, Hansen did not associate Keynes with the stagnation 
thesis, which has been a controversial issue in history of thought ever since the 1940s (see 
Schumpeter 1954, pp. 1172-73, on Keynes’s stagnationist “vision”; and the survey by Guthrie 
and Tarascio 1992).7 
Hansen (1939, 1946) distinguished sharply between movements along the marginal 
efficiency curve associated with changes of the rate of interest and upward shifts of the curve 
6 Hansen made detailed notes about Keynes’s 1937 article, kept as part of his papers held at 
Harvard University (Barber 1987, p. 203, n. 46; see also Mehrling 1997, pp. 133-34).
7 Dillard (1955, p. 328) expressed his bewilderment at the fact that Hansen’s 1954 well-
known Guide to Keynes discussed neither the relation of Keynes’s ideas to the stagnation 
thesis nor Hansen’s own formulation of that hypothesis.
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due to population growth and technical progress. Movements down the curve are not of great 
relevance for continuing income and employment creation, that is, for the process of 
economic growth away from secular stagnation. “Outlets for investment” may be of the 
widening type, in the form of population growth, and of the deepening type associated with 
technical progress that increases the capital-labour ratio (Hansen 1946, p. 185; this is distinct 
from Hawtrey’s original definition in terms of capital per unit of output, adopted by Hansen 
in 1939). In the absence of population growth and innovation, a “constant level of the rate of 
interest, no matter how low, would ultimately result in zero net investment”. The upshot is 
that “under-employment equilibrium” may be reached not mainly because of an elastic 
liquidity preference schedule, but essentially because of “limited investment opportunities 
(technical progress, etc.) combined with a marginal efficiency schedule which is not very 
highly elastic” (Hansen 1946, p. 185). 
Hansen (1936) introduced the term “underemployment equilibrium” into the literature . 
At that point, he was still critical of Keynes.8 After he started using Keynes’s theory of the 
multiplier and effective demand, seeing it as filling a gap in his own theory, he increasingly 
identified underemployment equilibrium with secular stagnation. By the mid 1960s, in his 
unpublished notes on Harry Johnson, he went so far as to claim that “‘secular stagnation’ was 
another name for … Keynesian ‘underemployment equilibrium’”, as both are based 
“fundamentally upon the same foundational stones” of the long-run behavior of population, 
technology and natural resources (quoted from Rosenof 1997, p. 51). Nominal wage rigidity 
and the Keynesian liquidity trap were not necessarily part of Hansen’s interpretation of 
unemployment equilibrium, although they could be included in the picture.9 Hansen (1946) 
acknowledged, after Haberler and Pigou, that an increase in the real amount of liquid assets 
could shift upwards the consumption function, but claimed that the ultimate effect of such 
increase – whether in absolute terms or in relative terms due to wage reductions – on 
consumption depended on the route by which increased liquidity was created and distributed 
among economic agents. He, therefore, disputed Haberler’s position (further elaborated by 
Patinkin 1948) that unemployment equilibrium was incompatible with price and wage 
8  On Hansen’s “transformation” see Barber 1987 and Mehrling 1997. Note that in his review 
of the General Theory he wrote of “secular unemployment” and of “stagnation” but did not 
use the term “secular stagnation” (Hansen 1936).
9 On Hansen’s depiction and interpretation of the liquidity trap, as part of the Hicks-Hansen 
IS-LM diagram, see Boianovsky 2004, pp. 108-09.
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flexibility, since wages and prices would fall continuously.
It is worth noting that Hansen’s secular stagnation concept had nothing to do with the 
notion – often ascribed to Keynes – that the problem is caused by the fact that “rich people 
save proportionally more”, so that the marginal propensity to consume is lower than the 
average propensity, with a declining ratio of consumption demand to income as income 
grows.10 Hansen (1941, pp. 233-34; see also Samuelson 1943) argued that for both theoretical 
and empirical reasons (referring to Kuznets 1941), the typical Keynesian consumption-
income schedule did not hold for long-run secular changes in real income, but only when 
large changes in income take place within a relatively short period of time over the business 
cycle.
Hansen's students and colleagues and postwar Keynesianism
The Second World War, in which government spending rose dramatically as a fraction of 
national income, cured the depression. The United State was able to overtake the British 
Empire in producing war materiel, without significantly reducing civilian consumption 
because of the scale of the unemployed resources that could be brought into use. However, 
what would happen after the war? One of the economists to tackle this problem, working as a 
consultant for the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), was Paul Samuelson, a young 
mathematical economist, aged 24 when war broke out in Europe. Unlike Hansen, with whom 
he had been working closely since the latter’s arrival at Harvard in 1937, Samuelson feared 
that the end of the war would be followed by a major depression. The argument on which this 
conclusion was based was provided in a pamphlet, published by the NRPB, that he co-
authored with Everett P. Hagen, After the War: 1918-20 (Samuelson, & Hagen 1943).
This pamphlet’s history of America’s involvement in the First World War contains 
passages that echo Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919).
The days before 1914 were far enough away to seem Utopian in retrospect, so that 
one could speak glibly of a return to "normalcy.” Those with more accurate memories 
10 For a description of the stagnation thesis precisely in those terms see e.g. Branson 1979. pp. 
185-86. 
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might have known that in 1914 there were signs that the world was about to enter 
upon a depression period and that, but for the World War, the Wilson administration 
might have had to face the same type of problems which were to become acute only 
two decades later. (Samuelson & Hagen 1943, pp. 2-3)
The First World War had saved the United States from depression, as the Second World War 
had done twenty-five years later. As Keynes had argued two decades earlier, Samuelson and 
Hagen argued that the return to ‘normalcy’ for which people longed was impossible.
However, Samuelson and Hagen based their conclusion not on Keynesian economics 
but on Hansen’s analysis. Recovery required something to drive investment. In the nineteenth 
century this had been provided by the frontier, population growth and the development of 
new industries. Even with such powerful forces driving investment, depressions could be 
long lasting, as in the 1890s but given strong underlying economic growth it was possible 
simply to wait and eventually demand would catch up with supply. In contrast, by 1914, the 
frontier was closed and population growth had slowed down, so investment had to rely on the 
development of new industries. There was a problem in that though rising wealth meant 
saving had risen, the need for investment had fallen, a combination that meant that depression 
would become more common.
Though the theory of stagnation was Hansen’s, he became more optimistic about the 
situation after the war, though Samuelson remained pessimistic till experience proved him 
wrong. In 1946 he wrote, anonymously, in the first issue of The American Economist,
Economic experts, in Government, universities, and private industry are just 
beginning to crawl out of the forecasters’ doghouse. Their well-publicized dire 
predictions of last fall—that by late in 1946 eight million unemployed people would 
be walking the streets with the nation's Gross National Product down more than 20 
billion dollars—have not yet been forgotten. And each new record height in 
department stores sales and job vacancies only adds to their discomfiture. (Samuelson 
1946, p. 7)
However, though predictions about immediate post-war difficulties proved wrong, Samuelson 
remained cautions about long-term prospects. In his widely-read textbook, Economics: An 
Introductory Analysis, he devoted several pages to the topic of secular stagnation (Samuelson 
13
1948, pp. 418-23). A mature, wealthy economy was, so Hansen argued, continually prone to a 
shortage of investment that might cause production to lag behind potential output. However, 
he left open the question of whether Hansen was right, explaining the arguments that could be 
made on the other side, leaving his readers to decide between the two positions. This passage 
was retained for the next two editions, and it was not till the fourth edition (1958, p. 349) that 
it was reduced to a short paragraph summarizing Hansen’s theory. It was followed by an even 
shorter paragraph outlining the alternative case where population growth and rapid 
innovation led to an excessive level of investment. “Secular stagnation” and “secular 
exhilaration” had become two analytical possibilities. Secular stagnation was no longer a 
historical thesis.
In the 1960s the discussion was linked to contemporary policy problems. In the fifth 
edition (Samuelson (1961, p. 392) he introduced a new possibility, that a democracy might 
choose to increase its growth rate by using easy monetary policy to increase the fraction of 
national income going to investment, creating a need for tight fiscal policy to hold back 
consumption spending. In the sixth edition (1964, p. 353), this was followed by a new section 
titled, “A decade of sluggish growth and rising unemployment” in which he pointed out that 
since 1953, the unemployment rate had been higher at each successive cyclical peak: 1952, 
2.5%; 1957, 4%; 1960, 5%. He concluded, “Although the picture does not add up to one of 
stagnation, it does seem to have elements of sluggishness in it” (ibid.). This was the 
justification for the policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administration of running a budget 
deficit, and in later editions was described as the New Economics at work. In the eighth 
edition (1970, p. 357) Samuelson illustrated this with a diagram, showing how “In the longer 
run, deficits may cancel out or public debt may trend upward or downward”: secular 
stagnation was the case where public debt was trending upwards. Using the same diagram, 
the message became even clearer in the ninth edition (1973, p. 361), in which he wrote 
“Whether surpluses must balance deficits must depend on circumstances”. Secular stagnation 
was part of an argument that, under some circumstances, the budget should not be balanced. 
The term disappeared from the index only in the twelfth edition (Samuelson and Nordhaus 
1985), when William Nordhaus completely restructured the book.
In all editions of his textbook, secular stagnation and what Samuelson called “secular 
exhilaration” were the linked to discussion of the problem of public debt. This was a problem 
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addressed by another of Hansen’s students, Evsey Domar. The context for his first publication 
on the topic (Domar 1944) was the stagnation thesis—the problem that private investment 
after the war might be insufficient to absorb total savings. As recalled by Domar (1992, p. 
124), his investigation was prompted by a diagram on p. 272 of Hansen (1941) showing the 
effect of a constant stream of investment on income. After an initial growth, income 
approached a horizontal asymptote, so that the capital-output ratio would increase without 
limit. Domar then investigated the consequences of a constant rate of growth of investment, 
with a resulting asymptotic capital-output ratio. He first applied that idea to the public debt 
burden problem. If the gap between private investment and saving had to be filled by 
government investment, the result would be growing debt, on which interest would have to be 
paid, raising the question of what would happen to the burden of debt. Domar made different 
assumptions about the growth rate of national income and proportion of saving absorbed by 
the government to establish whether the proportion of income taken in taxation would have to 
rise. These turned out to be an inverse function of the income growth rate. 
Though this paper acknowledged the importance of productivity this was not modeled 
explicitly, an omission that was remedied in a second paper, “Capital expansion, rate of 
growth and employment” (Domar 1946). This focused on the relationship between productive 
capacity and national income. Investment was related to both of these, for it generated 
aggregate demand, which determined income, and it added to productive capacity. Because 
investment was linked to the growth rate of productive capacity and the level of income, 
Domar could show that there was an equilibrium rate of growth, at which income would 
grow at the same rate as productive capacity. Secular stagnation was what happened when 
investment grew more slowly than this, for in that case there would be an increase in unused 
capacity and unemployment. However, if, somehow, the growth rate of income could be 
guaranteed, the result would be sufficient investment to achieve growth without resorting to a 
government deficit.
The doctrine of secular stagnation originated in Hansen’s analysis of the specific, 
perhaps unique, circumstances of the United States in the 1930s: the end of the frontier, 
declining population growth and the problems of a mature economy. In contrast, though 
Domar started from the immediate postwar problem of maintaining sufficient investment to 
absorb rising savings, he shifted his focus towards a general analysis of the problem of 
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economic growth. In a parallel paper (Domar 1947) where he drew out the economic 
implications of the model, he discussed the relevance of his theory to both the United States 
and the Soviet Union (hardly a mature economy) and he traced his ideas back to a large 
literature that was European as much as American. Much of the literature, he claimed, 
omitted one of the two aspects of investment that he believed needed to be considered 
together. Though he ended his discussion of the literature with Hobson and Keynes, it was 
Hobson he wanted to praise—“Hobson’s writings contain so many interesting ideas that it is 
a great pity he is not read more often” (Domar 1947, p. 51). In a footnote (numbered 11a) 
inserted after his article had been sent to the printer, he acknowledged that Harrod (Harrod 
1939b) had developed similar ideas.
Interestingly enough, Domar (1957, pp. 6 and 14) criticized Keynes (1936), but not 
Hansen, for suggesting that the economy tends to the “desert of the stationary state”. This 
resulted, according to Domar, from Keynes’s “peculiar” treatment of investment: whereas in 
the short-run Keynes considered only the multiplier effect of investment, in the long-run 
investment served only to increase the capital stock. This paradoxical approach, which 
overlooked the “dual” character of investment, was Domar’s explanation for some “less 
enlightened passages” of the General Theory, such as the euthanasia of the rentier and the 
blessings of the Egyptian pyramids. What should be explained, from Domar’s perspective, 
was how industrial economies had sustained secular rapid growth and moved away from the 
stationary state. He was bewildered at the fact that the “vision of the stationary state hung so 
heavily over the thinking of the Great Masters of the last century, and still preoccupies many 
of our contemporaries”. 
Domar’s general framework was, however, influenced by Hansen’s broad notion of the 
conditions to reach dynamic equilibrium. This comes out clearly in his contribution to the 
Hansen Festschrift, where Domar (1949) adopted Hansen’s approach to the determination of 
net investment in terms of two sets of changes, that is, “spontaneous changes” (technological 
progress, population growth, discovery of new resources) and “induced changes” caused by a 
preceding rise in income of the accelerator kind. Moreover, the whole “problem of capital 
accumulation” – in the sense of the ability of the economy to absorb capital at a rapid rate – 
only exists under the assumption that the possibilities of capital-deepening are limited, 
leading to potentially depressing effects of capital accumulation. As pointed out by Domar 
16
([1948] 1957, pp. 109-10), this was the essence of the view, rejected by Knight and Simons, 
but shared by Marxist, under-consumptionist and Keynesian branches of macroeconomics. 
Such a view was based on the assumption of a stable capital-output ratio, which was merely 
implied in Hansen but explicit in other authors such as Paul Sweezy and Roy Harrod.11 In 
contrast, from the perspective of the Knight-Simons position, investment opportunities are 
practically unlimited, and the whole problem of capital accumulation, which is behind 
Domar’s growth model, does not even exist. As acknowledged by Domar, there was 
insufficient empirical information to settle the issue. In terms of Domar’s well-known growth 
equation, a country with the “spontaneous” dynamic factors discussed by Hansen is able to 
“digest” a relatively large propensity to save, while absence of these factors makes a high 
propensity to save an obstacle to full employment.
Gardner Ackley (1961, pp. 509-12) – in a section about “Keynes and the stagnationists” 
in chapter 18 of his well-known macroeconomic textbook – criticized both Keynes and 
Hansen for overlooking that a growth of income (which the very act of investment permits) 
can prevent capital saturation. Keynesian stagnation, claimed Ackley, was not the “inevitable 
result” of capital accumulation. Keynes and the stagnationists had failed to realize that the 
size of the capital stock could only be considered large or small in relation to the size of 
output, and that it was possible for the two to grow together. According to Ackley, Domar 
was the first to see that by asking at what rate aggregate demand would have to grow in order 
to maintain full use of the rising capacity provided by capital accumulation. Domar’s growth 
model has no explicit role for population growth or technical progress, differently from 
Hansen’s approach. Ackley’s criticism, as based on Domar’s formulation, of Keynes and 
Hansen was that, even without population growth and technical progress, expansion of 
income could provide a market for the output of an increasing capacity. However, as pointed 
out by Alan Sweezy (1974, p. 46), Ackley missed the point that, in the absence of population 
growth, the problem was not just the impossibility of providing a market, but the “lack of 
labour to operate the additional capital goods”. Hansen was left open to Ackley’s criticism, 
Sweezy suggested, because he did not make completely clear that capital widening is only 
11 Samuelson (1964, p. 743), in his new chapter on growth, ascribed to Hansen the notion that 
the capital-output ratio is a technical constant and that any attempt to accumulate capital 
beyond the rate required by the annual growth of output will soon be unsuccessful due to 
excess capacity. Samuelson contrasted that with Solow’s neoclassical growth model.
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possible if labour supply is increasing. Domar (1957, p. 121) quoted a passage from Hansen 
(1947, p. 177) to that effect, where the boom may be interrupted because of labour shortage. 
Interestingly enough, Domar rejected that notion, which, of course, played an important role 
in Harrod’s explanation of the lower turning point. But, then again, Harrod made us of the 
concept of a “natural rate of growth”, absent from Domar’s equations.
Whereas stagnation is not explicitly mentioned in his 1939 essay, Harrod (1948, pp. v-
vi) stated in the foreword to his Dynamic Economics that “the idea which underlies this 
lectures is that sooner or later we [UK] shall be faced once more with the problem of 
stagnation, and that it is to this problem that economists should devote their main attention”. 
The US was not exempt from the problem of “chronic depression” either. That was explained 
in Harrod’s model by excess saving associated with the interaction between the natural, 
warranted and actual growth rates. If the warranted rate is above the natural rate, the actual 
rate must be below the warranted rate for most of the time, “and the centrifugal forces pull it 
further down, causing frequent periods of unemployment”, which he described as a 
“dynamised version of the stagnation thesis” (Harrod 1959, p. 455; see also 1960, p. 286; 
1973, p. 103). According to Harrod (1973, p. 103), fears of stagnation in the postwar period 
were not confirmed, due mainly to the vast postwar requirements for industrial 
reconstruction. However, symptoms of stagnation in the late 1960s in the UK and USA meant 
that economists should “keep a weather eye” on the dynamized version of the secular 
stagnation thesis (ibid). Hansen (1951, pp. 477-83) essentially subscribed to Harrod’s model 
of unstable growth. In a book missing detailed discussion of the stagnation thesis, the only 
reference to secular stagnation appears in Hansen’s (pp. 478-79) remark that Harrod (1948) 
dealt “fundamentally with the problem of long-term underemployment equilibrium, or 
secular stagnation”. In particular, pointed out Hansen (p. 479, n. 11), Harrod’s approach to the 
determinants of investment outlets was very close to Hansen’s (1941) own analysis. 
Benjamin Higgins (1950, p. 266), a former student and colleague of Hansen’s at Minnesota 
and Harvard respectively, suggested that Harrod’s theory was in many respects “an 
alternative formulation of the Hansen thesis”. 
Hansen’s stagnation thesis was largely an “oral tradition”, as pointed out by Higgins 
(1959, p. 171, n. 3). Higgins (1948, 1950, 1959 chapter 7) discussed that thesis extensively, 
and attempted a formalization of the argument by means of a theoretical model and diagrams. 
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The controversial character of the secular stagnation thesis came in part from the fact that it 
was advanced during the second Roosevelt administration, when the New Deal was 
implemented, with Hansen’s active participation. Hence, it became associated, in the opinion 
of businessmen and the public in general, with “New Deal economics” (Higgins 1948, pp. 
83-84). The core of the Hansen thesis, according to Higgins (1950, p. 255), is the growing 
gap between the trend of potential income and the trend of actual income. Higgins suggested 
that the thesis was better described as a theory of “increasing deflationary gap” or “increasing 
unemployment” instead of “secular stagnation”, since it was consistent with a rising trend of 
actual income per capita or even of actual investment. The issue of the proper interpretation 
of Hansen’s theory had come up in Alan Sweezy’s (1943, p. 69)12 clarification that 
“stagnation” meant essentially wasted productive capacity and unemployment caused by 
excess saving. It did not imply a cessation of technical progress, entrepreneurial initiative or 
private investment. The 1930s provided a striking example of “stagnation” accompanied by a 
“highly dynamic economic and social development” in the United States. Technological 
progress continued at a rapid rate, productivity rose markedly, but investment was not enough 
to keep income at such a level that would fully use the growing productive capacity, claimed 
Sweezy. He would come back to that in an historical piece about the New Deal, when he 
argued, like Higgins before him, that the term “secular stagnation” was misleading in that it 
suggested a general loss of potential for economic growth, which did not reflect Hansen’s 
meaning (Sweezy 1972, p. 121). 
Higgins’s (1950, 1959 chapter 7) attempted formalization of the stagnation thesis was 
based on the discussion of the path of the investment and saving functions as determined by 
differentiation with regard to the arguments in the respective functions. It did not explicitly 
contemplate  the  notion  of  a  negative  natural  rate  of  interest,  which  Pigou  (1943)  had 
associated with Hansen. Lawrence Klein (1947a, pp. 84-85; 206-13), in his well-known book 
based on a PhD thesis written under Samuelson’s supervision, picked up the negative natural 
interest  rate  from Pigou and turned it  into  a  main  feature  of  Keynesian economics.  The 
probability of a negative natural rate of interest resulted from the interest-inelasticity of both 
saving  and  (especially)  investment  functions,  which  Klein  regarded  as  empirically  well 
established.  Klein  described  the  contrary  opinion  of  “orthodox  economists”,  that  the 
12  Alan Sweezy was Paul Sweezy’s elder brother. Both had been at Harvard, with Hansen and 
Samuelson, in the late 1930s.
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investment  function  is  infinitely  elastic,  as  pertaining  to  the  world  of  Say’s  law.  In  a 
companion  article  to  his  book,  Klein  (1947b,  pp.  127-29)  included  a  section  about  the 
stagnation thesis, where he defended its validity and traced it back to the Marxian hypothesis 
of the declining rate of profit.
These developments help explain why, by the end of the 1940s, secular stagnation was 
increasingly associated with Keynes, not specifically with Hansen. The basis for this was of 
course the final chapter of the General Theory, “Concluding notes on the social philosophy 
towards which the General Theory might lead” in which he had speculated on a world in 
which capital became so plentiful as to cause the euthanasia of the rentier. In the early years 
this was not associated with secular stagnation, a doctrine linked with Hansen who, despite 
talk of his “conversion” on the train from Minnesota to Harvard, and despite his adoption of 
the  Keynesian  multiplier,  continued  to  differentiate  his  work  clearly  from  that  of  the 
“Keynesians”,  as  did  his  student  Samuelson.  However,  once  secular  stagnation  was 
interpreted in terms of a negative natural rate of interest and discussed in the context of the 
Pigou  effect,  it  could  become  detached  from  the  institutionalist-continental  European 
theoretical framework in which Hansen had defended the doctrine and be linked to Keynes.
Hansen’s  version  of  the  secular  stagnation  thesis  was  not  the  only  one  available. 
Something that resembled secular stagnation in that it involved stagnation that persisted over 
several business cycles from the idea, widely used in the 1930s, that there were fifty-year 
“Kondratiev” cycles in economic activity. A Kondratiev downturn might, till the upturn, be 
hard to distinguish from secular stagnation. So too might the lulls between Schumpeterian 
waves of innovation. But this was as much a description of the problem as an explanation. 
Apart from the Marxian approach supported by Paul Sweezy and Klein, Schumpeter (1942) 
and Steindl (1952) put forward distinct explanations of the lack of dynamism of capitalism. 
Steindl, like Schumpeter, was concerned with the potentially depressing consequences of the 
shift  of  capitalism  from  competition  to  oligopoly.  Whereas  Schumpeter’s  Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy was widely read, Steindl’s Maturity and Stagnation did not attract 
much  attention  until  its  reprint  in  1976  by  the  Monthly  Review Press,  when  heterodox 
economists started to take it into account. Hansen (1954b) wrote a largely positive review 
essay  on  Steindl  (1952).  One  should,  according  to  Hansen  (p.  409)  classify  stagnation 
hypotheses into three different categories: (i) a theory based mainly on exogenous factors 
(technology,  population  and  new  territories),  represented  by  Hansen’s  own  analysis  and 
“perhaps also that of Harrod”; (ii) a theory based mainly on fundamental changes in social 
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institutions (increasing state intervention, growth of the labour movement, non-competitive 
structures)  and  their  impact  on  the  “arterial  sclerosis”  of  capitalism,  as  represented  by 
Schumpeter; and (ii) a theory based mainly on endogenous microeconomic factors, inherent 
in capitalism, such as the development of imperfect competition and oligopoly, as represented 
by Steindl. 
Hence, whereas both Schumpeter and Steindl looked for changes in the price system as 
remedies to be applied in order to prevent stagnation, Hansen’s macroeconomic approach 
stressed the role of fiscal policy. The timing of publication of Steindl (1952) did not help, as 
the  American  economy,  stimulated  by  spending  on  the  Korean  War,  was  experiencing  a 
period of  economic growth.  In Hansen’s  (p.  412)  view, that  did not  disprove any of  the 
versions of  the stagnation thesis.  “How inventive,  productive and dynamic the American 
private  enterprise  can be when operating under  the pull  of  adequate  aggregate  demand”, 
claimed Hansen, “has been demonstrated in a remarkable laboratory experiment during the 
last fifteen years” (the Second World War). However, he warned, there were “sound reasons 
for the proposition that the economy cannot on its own generate enough steam to provide its 
full potential growth”.  Unaided by the “massive fiscal powers of the federal government”, 
the American economy should not be able to reach its full-employment growth path.13 Hansen 
(1957a, p. 114) would deploy again the term “laboratory experiment” in his review of W. 
Fellner’s 1956 Trends and cycles in economic activity, a Keynesian economist critical of the 
secular stagnation thesis. Hansen disputed Fellner’s claim that exogenous technical progress 
was the main element behind the long period of sustained growth since the end of the war. 
Such path of “unparalleled growth and expansion”, starting from a condition of stagnation in 
interwar Europe and in the 1930s in the US, could not happen, argued Hansen, without the 
remarkable increase in the fiscal  activities of  the government.  “Now this  is  precisely the 
Keynesian  remedy  for  the  stagnation  from  which  we  have  emerged”  (ibid).  Moreover, 
technological progress was probably stimulated by adequate aggregate demand conditions, 
13 Stagnation was also the topic of  Ingvar Svennilson’s (1954) well-known monograph about 
the European economy in the interwar period. His analysis was based on the so-called 
Kaldor-Verdoorn law – formulated independently by him – about the positive effect of 
production on productivity due to dynamic returns to scale (see Boianovsky 2012). As 
Hansen (1957, pp. 6-7) pointed out with evident satisfaction in his American Economy, 
Svennilson took into account as well the negative impact on economic activity of the 
declining European population growth rate.
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meaning that the actual and potential growth trends are not independent from one another. “It 
requires”,  charged  Hansen,  a  “pretty  heavy black-out  of  a  vast  laboratory  experiment  to 
believe  that  this  vastly  enlarged  role  of  government  has  really  played  no  role  in  the 
spectacular  transition  from stagnation  to  sustained  growth  and  expansion”(ibid).  Clearly, 
from Hansen’s point of view, the postwar boom did not disprove but rather confirmed the 
secular stagnation thesis. But many macroeconomists thought otherwise, as discussed next.
Macroeconomic theory
By 1953 when, unemployment fell to a mere 2.5%, the idea that the US economy was 
doomed to secular stagnation had fallen out of favor. The term was still discussed but 
references were more often critical—for example, some economists saw it as illustrating the 
tendency of some economists to treat any problem that had lasted for more than a short 
period as being a permanent one. In the 1930s that problem had been stagnation, in the 1950s 
it was the dollar shortage, and in other periods would be something else. There was also an 
increasing tendency over the next twenty years for secular stagnation to be linked not to 
macroeconomics but to occur in discussions of economic history, history of economic 
thought or, increasingly, development economics, the field in which Higgins increasingly 
specialized. However, as Samuelson’s textbook shows, secular stagnation was still used, not 
as a historical tendency, but as descriptive of a particular problem, such as the stagnation, 
over several business cycles, to which the “New economics” of the Kennedy administration 
was the response. Remaining flexible over its causes and permanence, economists used 
secular stagnation to describe a situation into which capitalist economies could get into. 
There was no presumption that a free market economy must exhibit full employment without 
government intervention, leaving open the possibility that inappropriate policy could create 
stagnation. For economists, such as Samuelson, who assumed that the United States was 
characterized by oligopoly, analyzed using devices such as mark-up pricing and horizontal 
supply curves, there was no theoretical problem in maintaining such a position. However, for 
economists who thought in terms of perfectly competitive markets, or who believed that free 
enterprise must generate an optimal outcome, the situation was different. 
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Robert Lekachman (1964, 1966) was one of the few economists in the 1960s who 
regarded secular stagnation as central to Keynesian macroeconomics. Lekachman (1964, p. 
5) suggested that secular stagnation could be a convenient label for “any persistent tendency” 
of aggregate demand and supply to approach equilibrium at less than full employment. In his 
Richard T. Ely lecture delivered at the AEA, Harry Johnson (1971, p. 6) pointed out the role 
played by the stagnation thesis in turning Keynesian economics into the new orthodoxy in the 
postwar period. According to Johnson, the view that unemployment is always the foremost 
social problem was elevated into a “dogma” in the US under the leadership of Alvin Hansen, 
whose theory of secular stagnation “has been quietly forgotten, or frugally converted into a 
theory applicable to underdeveloped countries”, although vestiges of it still lingered in 
American Keynesianism at the time.
Johnson was quite positive about Leijonhufvud’s (1968) distinction between 
Keynesian economics and the economics of Keynes. From Leijonhufvud’s perspective, 
“Keynesian economics”, as represented by the Hicks-Hansen IS-LM diagram and by 
Hansen’s stagnation thesis, differed essentially from the “economics of Keynes”, which 
should be understood in terms of a disequilibrium framework. By the late 1960s, 
disequilibrium macroeconomics had become relatively influential, although this would be 
short-lived (see Backhouse and Boianovsky 2013).  The disequilibrium approach to 
macroeconomics had started with chapters 13 and 14 of Patinkin’s (1956) Money, Interest 
and Prices. Chapter 14 included a section on “secular growth versus secular stagnation”, an 
expression he used to describe what the classical economists had in mind when discussing the 
problem of “a general glut on the market”. That was part of his analysis of Keynesian and 
classical theories of unemployment. The real balance effect meant that there could be no 
permanent stagnation or long-run equilibrium with unemployment, but there might be an 
adjustment process in which unemployment persisted for a long period of time. In 
emphasizing the secular aspects of the real-balance effect, Patinkin followed Pigou (1943) 
and Hansen (1951), both mentioned by him.14 
Leijonhufvud (1968, p. 316), too, pointed out the original secular context of the 
14 Hansen (1951) granted that the Pigou effect can stop deflation and the decline in output and 
employment in the downswing. He argued, however, that, since prices stop falling when the 
economy reaches the upper turning point, real balances will cease rising and the economy 
will stabilize short of full employment. 
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Pigou effect, which should be seen against the background of postwar “Stagnationist 
Keynesianism” and its insistence that it proved the possibility of “unemployment 
equilibrium”. Leijonhufvud (1968, pp. 159-61) interpreted the stagnationist school as denying 
the proper working of the price mechanism, due to inelastic functions, which he contrasted 
with Keynes. Like Patinkin before him, Leijonhufvud deemed a purely static interpretation of 
unemployment equilibrium incompatible with Keynes, and argued for a dynamic 
disequilibrium interpretation. He acknowledged Patinkin’s priority, but claimed that his point 
for a dynamic interpretation was made in “stronger and more general terms” than Patinkin’s, 
for Patinkin had laid great weight on the interest-inelasticity of investment as a factor 
influencing the time length of disequilibrium while the real balance effect operates. As noted 
by Leijonhufvud (p. 176), the stagnationist point about a negative natural rate of interest was 
based on the lack of outlets for saving. Leijonhufvud rejected that notion by referring to 
Martin Bailey’s (1962, pp. 107-14; 123-30) and Cassel’s (1903, pp. 106-09) argument – 
subscribed to by Simons, as discussed above – that the demand for fixed durable capital 
goods becomes very elastic at low interest rates. As observed by Leijonhufvud (p. 189, n. 2), 
Keynes’s position about the possibility of capital saturation was quite distinct from Cassel’s 
or Bailey’s. At the same time, Leijonhufvud (pp. 410-11) denied that Keynes was a 
stagnationist in Hansen’s sense.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, as macroeconomic performance 
deteriorated in the US and Europe, the notion of  “stagflation” (the combination of economic 
stagnation with inflation) caused by aggregate supply shocks came to the fore. The direct 
observed relation between unemployment and inflation posed a challenge to the traditional 
Phillips Curve. But that differed from secular stagnation, which remained out of most of the 
macroeconomic literature. As documented by Rosenof (1997, chapter 13), secular stagnation 
then attracted some attention from heterodox economists who had already discussed it in the 
past, such as Paul Sweezy (1982) and Joseph Steindl (1979). It also caught the attention of 
economic journalist Leonard Silk (1976), who referred to Hansen in the process. Steindl 
(1987) wrote the entry on “stagnation” in the New Palgrave, which mainly restated his 1952 
interpretation and surveyed classic contributions by Hansen and Marxian authors. Steindl’s 
entry would not be reproduced in the second 2008 edition of the New Palgrave, which did not 
include an entry on the topic. The economic effects of the decline in population growth in 
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developed countries was also discussed in the 1970s and 1980s by demographers, with 
occasional references to secular stagnation that tend to dismiss its practical relevance (see e.g. 
Neal,1978; Espenshade 1978). 
Secular stagnation continued to be discussed from the point of view of the history 
of economic thought, especially after Hansen died in 1975. Samuelson (1976, 1988, 2002) 
discussed Hansen’s stagnation thesis in a series of papers, where he pointed to its relation to 
Keynes’s 1937 essay and to Domar’s and Harrod’s growth models, and called attention to the 
fact that Hansen did not anticipate stagnation in the postwar period.15 Samuelson’s 1988 
article – written on the occasion of the centenary of Hansen’s birthday – was the first 
formalization of Hansen’s secular stagnation thesis since Higgins’s (1950) early attempt. As 
explained by Samuelson in correspondence of 11 February 1997 with one of the authors (M. 
Boianovsky), “I enclose a 1988 reprint few have noticed. This Keynes-Hansen-Samuelson 
non-linear limit cycle enabled me to discern (50 years later!) that decelerating population 
growth, at the same time that it lowered the acceleration-principle investment propensity, also 
lowered (by virtue of Modigliani’s lifecycle theory of saving) the propensity to save.”
Changing conceptions of a mature economy
The major problem with the stagnation thesis was that, though US defense expenditures did 
fall sharply after 1945, there was sufficient demand for output to continue to grow; resources 
had to be poured into Europe to alleviate hardship and sustain US allies against the Soviet 
threat. Over the slightly longer term, the outbreak of the Korean War caused defense 
spending to rise dramatically, albeit not to the heights of the Second World War, making 
inflation, not depression the immediate threat. Irrespective of whether or not there was a 
tendency to secular stagnation, it was not an immediate threat. There was, however, a more 
15 Samuelson probably had in mind Hansen’s (1943, pp. 18, 21) expectation that the 
“potentialities for expansion of consumption and private investment in the immediate postwar 
period are sufficient to indicate the possibility of a genuine and fairly prolonged postwar 
boom”.  In a latter post war period, following the transitional readjustment, “we may assume 
a gradually increasing national income due to increased productivity and population growth”. 
Hansen (1954, p. 412) would later refer to the postwar increase in population growth as a 
“spurt closely related to World War II”. 
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profound reason for secular stagnation losing its appeal. In the 1930s, the idea of a mature 
economy was associated with the demographic transition and the exhaustion of investment 
opportunities, making it easy for Hansen to associate it with stagnation. However, by the 
1960s, though the United States was still seen as, in some sense, a mature economy, that 
notion came to be conceived very differently. The development of the national accounts 
meant that the United States could be contrasted much more clearly with Europe and the 
“under-developed world”: the gap between the US per capita income and that of the rest of 
the world had increased enormously. “Modernization theory”, which pervaded not only 
development economics but other social sciences, such as political science and international 
relations (see Gilman 2003), saw the United States as the economy towards which other 
countries were moving. It was, in John Kenneth Galbraith’s words, the archetypal Affluent 
Society (195?).
This conception of the United States as a mature, modern economy was shown most 
clearly in its political context in Walt Rostow’s widely read book, The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960). Countries passed through a series of historical 
stages, such as the “take-off into self-sustained growth”, Rostow’s characterization of the 
British Industrial Revolution, a stage through which other developed countries had passed, 
and culminated in the “age of high mass consumption”, represented by the contemporary 
United States. This thesis was challenged, most strongly by Alexander Gerschenkron, but 
though he questioned the idea that countries had to go through preordained stages, the idea of 
“backwardness”, with its implication of a hierarchy, was still there. A modern economy might 
have slower growth than one less advanced in its economic development, because there 
would be less opportunity for others to “catch up”. In the growth accounting of Angus 
Madison, “catch up”--growth that arose from the adoption of technologies already in use in 
more advanced countries--was one of the many contributions to economic growth, by 
definition not available to the most advanced country. But this was hardly a context that left 
room for a mature economy to stagnate. Worse, if it did, it would raise fundamental questions 
about the superiority of the free-market system over its Soviet counterpart. Government 
spending might be necessary to maintain full employment, as was the case in the 1960s when 
the Kennedy tax cuts showed the effectiveness of Keynesian remedies, but in the Cold War it 
was natural for the government to play a larger role in the economy than in the 1930s. The 
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consensus on this point had not yet broken down.
Rostow (1956, p. 27) did not exclude the “possibility of growth giving way to secular 
stagnation or decline in the long term”. The mechanism is not discussed, although Rostow 
(1960, p. 91) referred to “secular spiritual stagnation” as a possibility beyond high mass-
consumption, provoked by diminishing marginal utility of real income as economic growth 
advanced. “Will man fall into secular spiritual stagnation, finding no worthy outlet for  the 
expression  of his energies, talents, and instinct to reach for immortality?”, asked him. That 
was a speculative question, but some 50 years later Rostow discussed in detail the secular 
stagnation scenario in his 1998 book The great population spike and after: reflections on the 
21st century, followed by his 2000 article on Japan and the “political economy of a stagnant 
population”. Japanese economy had entered in the 1990s in its fourth phase, after the intense 
growth of the decades 1950-1980. Rostow (2000) addressed, in Hansenian terms, the 
connection between the decline of population growth and Japanese economic stagnation in 
Japan. According to Rostow (p. 391), Japan was just the first case, since data indicated that 
“all nations will have to settle down to a stagnant population, at best, if they are to survive”, 
including the problem of the investment gap. Differently from his 1960 manifesto, Rostow 
(1998, p. 131; 2000, p. 393) discusses secular stagnation carefully, and relies on Hansen’s 
framework for that. “Three quarters of a century forward, there is a distinctly worried 
character to Alvin Hansen’s presentation of what he believed in the 1930s was the end of the 
the great innovations of the past and the coming of a stagnant population”. Clearly, Rostow’s 
sense of a “mature economy” changed since his 1960 book, reflecting not only the new 
economic landscape of the 1990s but also the end of the Cold War. 
Secular Stagnation, now and then
The heretical character of the secular stagnation hypothesis is well reflected in Summers’s 
reference, at his 2013 IMF speech in honour of Stanley Fischer, to “a set of older and much 
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more radical ideas that I have to say were pretty much rejected in 14.46216, a set of older 
ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation”. Summers contrasted secular stagnation 
with theories that take the average level of output and employment over a long time period as 
given. Mainstream macroeconomics – in both its New Classical and New Keynesian versions 
– has focused on the variance of  output  and employment,  under the assumption that  the 
working of the market will eventually bring back full employment and bridge output gaps. 
From that  perspective,  macroeconomics  is  about  fluctuations  of  employment  and  output 
around their normal or equilibrium levels, in the sense that the goal of macroeconomic policy 
is to reduce volatility. The “new secular stagnation hypothesis”, on the other hand, as claimed 
by Summers (2014a, p. 29), argues that “the second moment” of the time-series is “second-
order relative to the first moment – the average level of output and employment through 
time”.  The Japanese experience since the 1990s and the overall  poor performance of the 
American and European economies after the 2007-08 crisis may indicate, along the lines of 
the secular stagnation hypothesis, that market forces are insufficient to bring the economy to 
its  full-employment  growth  path.  Summers  (p.  32)  has  defined  secular  stagnation  as  a 
permanently  negative  natural  rate  of  interest,  a  concept  he  ascribed  to  Hansen  (1939). 
Although that definition may be thought implicit in Hansen, its first clear formulation was , as 
we have seen, given by Klein (1947). 
The return of the secular stagnation thesis has been preceded by the revival  of the 
concept of the liquidity trap and its implications for the formulation of monetary policy, now 
under the guise of the “zero lower bound” to nominal interest rates (see Boianovsky 2004). 
Secular stagnation means that the zero lower bound problem is turned into a permanent – not 
just transitory cyclical – feature, of the economy (Krugman 2014). Modeling the economy 
with a permanent steady state negative natural rate of interest is not straightforward. In the 
representative  agent  framework,  of  the  Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans  kind,  steady  state  real 
interest rate cannot fall below the rate of discount, which is assumed positive (otherwise the 
model explodes). An alternative is to build an overlapping generations model along the lines 
of  Samuelson (1958),  with heterogeneous agents,  which in  principle  can accommodate a 
long-run  negative  natural  interest  rate.  This  has  been  done  by  Eggertsson  and  Mehrotra 
(2014),  the first  attempt to formalize Summers’s “new secular stagnation hypothesis”.  As 
seen above, Pigou got around the analytical problem of a negative natural rate by postulating 
16 That was the course number for Stanley Fischer’s class on monetary economics at MIT for 
graduate students, attended by Summers.
28
that saving decisions of the “representative man” are affected by other factors beside the 
expected yield from capital accumulation. The Pigou effect, which played a role in the 1940 
and  1950s  in  the  critical  reception  of  Hansen’s  thesis  as  a  long-term  proposition,  is 
conspicuously  absent  from recent  discussions  about  secular  stagnation,  as  it  largely  was 
before in the literature about the zero lower bound (see Boianovsky 2004, p. 116, for the 
general exclusion of the real balance effect from the Euler condition used in deriving the IS 
function in optimizing IS-LM models).
As  observed  by  Ben  Bernanke  (2015),  the  secular  stagnation  hypothesis  is  about 
inadequate aggregate demand, not aggregate supply. Even if potential output is growing, the 
hypothesis  holds  that  depressed  investment  and  consumption  spending  will  prevent  the 
economy from reaching this potential.17 Robert Gordon (2014) has focused on the “supply 
side” of secular stagnation, that is, the effects on the potential growth trend. According to 
Gordon (p.  48),  Hansen’s  version of  the secular  stagnation thesis  was written before the 
invention  of  the  concept  of  potential  output  and  its  measurement.  Therefore,  he  argues, 
Hansen  and  his  colleagues  lacked  a  notion  of  aggregate  productivity  or  its  growth  rate. 
However, as discussed above, Higgins (1950) and other stagnationists stressed that the key 
indicator was the deflationary gap between potential and actual output trends. Gordon implies 
that the 1930s and 1940s stagnationists were not aware of the fact that average aggregate 
productivity was on the rise in the late 1930s, in contrast with recent experience. Available 
data  mentioned  by  Gordon  indicate  that  productivity  increased  by  3.8%  in  1937-40,  as 
compared to 0.8% in 2009-14, which points to an important difference between stagnation 
then and now. Nevertheless, the absence of precise numbers about productivity growth in the 
1930s did not prevent A. Sweezy from pointing out that secular stagnation was not about lack 
of technical progress, which proceeded at a rapid rate at the time.
Summers (2014b) points to some main factors behind the apparently negative natural 
rate of interest: the reducing capital intensity of some key industries (particularly in sectors 
involving information technology),  declining population growth,  increasing saving due to 
higher income and capital inequality, and falling relative prices of capital goods. He refers to 
Hansen only in connection with the demographic factor, probably because that is expressed in 
the  very  title  of  Hansen’s  1938  presidential  address.  However,  Hansen  did  discuss  the 
perverse  effect  of  capital-saving  innovations  on  investment  demand  and  the  increase  of 
17 Bernanke, however, rejects the notion that secular stagnation applies to modern American 
economy, partly for reasons that remind of the Knight-Simons contention.
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savings coming from corporations (see Higgins 1948). Like many others, Summers believes 
Hansen’s stagnation thesis was proved wrong by the post-war economic growth and the baby 
boom, until changing economic and demographic circumstances led to its recent restatement.
It is generally assumed that the secular stagnation hypothesis disappeared because it was 
obviously refuted by events. However, any refutation is far from obvious, begging questions 
about how the concept is defined. Changing attitudes towards secular stagnation have always 
had an important political dimension. Though Hansen had mentioned the idea earlier, it took 
off only in 1938. It was not just that the US had experienced nine years of depression: the 
shock was that recovery, that till the summer of 1937 seemed strong, suddenly aborted, with a 
downturn even more severe than that of 1929. By this point, after a number of attempts to 
tackle the depression, some of which had to be abandoned, the New Deal was widely seen as 
taking a turn that  was critical  of  business and business opposition to the New Deal  was 
growing (see Phillips-Fein 2010). In 1938, responding to a request from Roosevelt, a joint 
resolution of Congress established a Temporary National Economic Committtee, which sat 
for  three  years  and  produced  33,000  pages  of  hearings  and  monographs  on  problem of 
excessive concentration of economic power, believed to lie at the root of America’s problems. 
This was the context in which Hansen and Currie persuaded policy makers to take seriously 
the idea that the problem might lie in the coordination of saving and investment, an idea 
closely linked to secular stagnation (see Backhouse 2014). Secular stagnation was thus highly 
political from the start: it was not just an academic idea.
Herbert  Stein  (1969,  pp.  175-6)  writing  an  insider’s  history  of  America’s  “fiscal 
revolution” put the politics in a more subtle way.
There were a great many people who would not accept the fiscal prescription 
based on this explanation [historic changes that had reduced the propensity to 
invest]. They did not like the explanation because it denied the possibility of 
stimulating  investment  by  modifying  policies  to  which  they  were  opposed 
[perceived as anti-business]. They could not accept the view of investment as a 
passive response to historical factors, which seemed to deny the dynamic role of 
the  businessmen,  in  which  they  took  pride  and  which  "legitimized"  their 
incomes and position in society. And they could not accept the never-ending 
growth of the federal debt to which the thesis seemed to point.
Conservatives  could  only  accept  fiscal  policy  when  it  was  presented  as  a  remedy  for 
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fluctuations, not for the problem of stagnation and when it was not linked to the prospect of 
continuing  government  deficits.  Stein  claimed  that  the  fading  of  secular  stagnation  was 
“partly”  the result of economic arguments: intellectual arguments were well developed by 
1941, and the data were changing, with the rise in spending due to the war, which continued 
after the war.
Postwar  experience  certainly  showed  that  there  was  no  immediate  problem  but  its 
implications for secular stagnation depended critically on how the ideas was interpreted. The 
historical thesis centered on Turner’s argument about the ending of the frontier might seem an 
argument from a different era. It no longer made sense to see secular stagnation as a problem 
of  economic  maturity—now  seen  as  involving  high  mass  consumption  and  rapid 
technological development, for it seemed to be a problem afflicting “immature economies” in 
the  under-developed  world.  Yet  as  long  as  Keynesian  theory  was  thought  to  show  that 
economies would not necessarily achieve full employment, the idea that fiscal stimulus might 
be needed to maintain aggregate demand remained a real possibility. Postwar reconstruction, 
the Korean War, the Cold War and the massively increased role for government might raise 
demand sufficiently that there was in practice no need to make a case for expansion (at least 
till the early 1960s when Keynesians did make this case) but it did not mean that secular 
stagnation was completely disproved. It remained possible that stagnation would re-emerge 
should the role of government be reduced.
What probably killed the idea among academic economists was the acceptance, by the 
1970s,  of  the  rational-agent  general  competitive  equilibrium  model  as  the  dominant 
framework  in  macroeconomics,  finally  displacing  the  presumption,  rooted  in  the 
institutionalist literature of the 1930s, that markets were oligopolistic, with prices being set 
not by competitive markets but by corporate pricing policies. When this happened, it became 
very difficult to make a case that secular stagnation was theoretically coherent. Arguments 
from economic theory and ideology came together to push the concept out of contemporary 
economics. This makes it much less surprising that the concept has re-emerged in the face of 
the prospect of continuing stagnation. The history of the doctrine suggests that its future will 
depend as much on political factors as on specifically economic arguments.
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